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The paper focuses on economic disadvantage (loss) or economic advantage (gain)
among first- and second-generation immigrants in Switzerland in comparison to the
Swiss majority group. We distinguish between economic and noneconomic (political,
family reunion, and educational pursuit) immigrants. Utilising data from the 2007
Swiss Health Survey, we found that economic immigrant males are able to attain
higher income than the comparable majority group already in the first generation,
whereas female economic immigrants manage to do so only in the second
generation. Educational male immigrants are doing almost as well in Switzerland as
male economic immigrants. In the second generation, female noneconomic
immigrants are economically better integrated than their male counterparts when
compared to a similar Swiss majority group. Female immigrants are able to close the
pay gap with the Swiss majority group. The meaning and implications of the findings
are discussed in light of immigration theory in general and the Swiss immigration
policy in particular.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Immigration has long been understood within the “push–pull”
paradigm as a rational economic behaviour with individuals
responding to a wage differential between markets (e.g., Bauer &
Zimmermann, 1999; Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, &
Pellegrino, 1999; Passaris, 1989). That is, people migrate from places
characterised by capital scarcity and labour abundance to places
characterised by capital abundance and labour scarcity. In other
words, people migrate from poor countries with depressed economic
conditions to prosperous economies with abundant opportunities.
They do so in order to receive higher economic returns on their
human capital resources than the returns they could possibly receive
in their home country. Indeed, according to the traditional view,
immigration is an economically motivated behaviour with “economic
immigrants” moving across space in search of better opportunities for
upward social and economic mobility for themselves and for their
children. However, pure economic migration is only part of the
immigration story. Immigration behaviour can be also motivated by
noneconomic considerations. Such immigrants, indeed, cannot be
viewed as economic immigrants, and the rationale for their immigration
cannot be defined in pure economic terms.
The vast majority of studies on reasons for migration has made
a binary distinction between forced and voluntary immigration
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(Lorenzen, 2017); that is to say the distinction was mainly between
immigrants who search for better economic opportunities and immi-
grants who leave their homeland to avoid oppression, political prose-
cution, and violence. Indeed, the latter group of immigrants flees from
places that are infected by dictatorship, wars, and corruption to seek
refuge in countries dominated by democratic rules and peaceful con-
ditions. Although such immigrants also search for a better life and
prosperous economic conditions, they cannot be viewed as (purely)
economic immigrants but are typically defined by host countries as
political immigrants or refugees.
In addition to economic and political immigrants, there is another
sizeable group of immigrants that arrives in the new homeland to
marry, unite, or re-unite with a native spouse or family members.
Apparently, family-based immigrants are different from economic
immigrants both in terms of motivation and in terms of attributes.
Although some studies have shown that these immigrants also aspire
to achieve occupational and income upward mobility (especially in the
case of highly skilled couples; see, e.g., Riaño, 2011; Tissot, 2016),
such immigrants are typically not considered by host countries as
(purely) economic immigrants (e.g., Riaño, 2011; Tissot, 2016). Nor are
they viewed as political immigrants.
Likewise, a considerable number of immigrants initially arrive in
the host country to pursue higher education; later on, however, for a
variety of reasons they pursue employment and high salary in the new
country. Hence, they choose to stay and reside there. Indeed, educa-
tional immigrants differ substantially from other immigrants in circum-
stances of arrival, motivations for migration, and sociodemographic
attributes. They should be viewed, therefore, as a distinct group of
immigrants.
Like economic immigrants, all groups of immigrants may strive for
upward economic mobility. Thus, they try to convert their human cap-
ital resources into higher economic outcomes. However, they repre-
sent somewhat fuzzier categories than the group of economic
immigrants and differ in terms of selectivity and socio-demographic
attributes. According to Chiswick (1986), economic immigrants tend
to be positively self-selected. They are more likely to have better skills
that are transferable to the local labour market (Chiswick, Lee, &
Miller, 2005). Other groups of immigrants, on the contrary, are less
likely to be self-selected in terms of professional skills, because
economic factors are not the main determinant of their migration. For
example, Chiswick et al. (2005) demonstrate that the economic inte-
gration of skilled and economic immigrants is more successful than
that of family-based immigrants and that of refugees. This is so
because economic immigrants are positively selected and, thus, are
able to convert human capital resources into financial resources more
successfully than other immigrants. By contrast, political immigrants
do not select themselves into the new country on the basis of eco-
nomic considerations (e.g., Akesson & Coupland, 2018). Thus, differ-
ential self-selection mechanisms may affect the economic success of
different immigrant groups in the labour market of the host society
(see Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990).
Whereas the main theoretical premise of the classical model of
assimilation leads one to expect a uniform straight-line pattern for all
groups, we contend that patterns of economic assimilation are likely
to differ from one group of immigrants to another. More specifically,
we expect the economic integration of economic immigrants to be
the most successful and that of noneconomic, particularly political
immigrants, to be the least successful. This expectation is derived
from a growing body of research that underscores differences in
economic integration across subgroups of immigrants (e.g., Alba &
Nee, 2009; Aydemir, 2002; Büchel & Frick, 2004; Chiswick
et al., 2005; Cobb-Clark, 1993; Colic-Peisker, 2011; Maskileyson &
Semyonov, 2017: Semyonov, Raijman, & Maskileyson, 2015;
Zhou, 1997). More specifically, researchers have long argued that
the distinction between economic immigrants and family-based
immigrants or refugees is particularly consequential for understanding
differential patterns of integration among immigrants (e.g., Bevelander
& Pendakur, 2014; Chiswick et al., 2005; Connor, 2010; Duleep &
Regets, 1996).
However, the expectation stated above is only part of the inte-
gration story. Swiss migration policies are likely to create differential
opportunities for different immigrant groups due to the dual system
of migration rights for different types of immigrants (Blos, Fischer, &
Straubhaar, 1997). The current migration policy system in Switzerland
classifies foreigners differently according to their country of origin
and skill level (Hercog & Sandoz, 2018). Existing legislation prioritises
immigrants from the European Union (EU) and European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) and is very restrictive toward those from other
countries (Hercog & Sandoz, 2018). Moreover, the policies in
Switzerland favour economic integration of skilled immigrants
(who are considered to arrive on basis of economic reasons) while
challenging or restricting the integration of other types of immigrants
(Blos et al., 1997). Employment is a necessary prerequisite for visa
admission and acquisition of a residential status. Therefore, economic
immigration to Switzerland is selective and only possible when
foreigners are able to provide a confirmation of an employment in a
specific sector of economic activity and in a defined geographical area
(Dhima, 1991; Fischer & Straubhaar, 1994). The Swiss government
authorises entry visas if the job of a foreigner suits the urgent labour
need or generally improves the situation at a local labour market. This
often is expressed in admission of immigrants for employment in
lower qualified jobs, mainly in the manufacturing industry, and the
construction, food, and restaurant sectors (Dhima, 1991). It should be
also noted that exceptions for entry visas in Switzerland are also made
for refugees or for purposes of family reunification (Blos et al., 1997;
Fischer & Straubhaar, 1994; Yeung, 2016).
It is also worth noting that studies suggest that immigrants do not
migrate for only one reason but for a mixed variety of reasons
(Lorenzen, 2017). While we agree with the idea that each individual
migrant can have multiple-mixed motives for migrating, it is plausible
to classify immigrants according to the major reason for migration as
subjectively defined. In this study, we distinguish among four primary
groups of immigrants based on their self-reported main reasons for
migration: economic, political, family reunion, and educational. Each
of the four major reasons is potentially subject to a different
integration policy.1
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In the analysis that follows, we examine the extent to which
the economic assimilation of immigrants (captured by the size of
income gain or loss in comparison to natives) differs between eco-
nomic and noneconomic (political, family reunion, and educational
pursuit) immigrants in Switzerland, a country which has received
many immigrants in recent decades and where the share of people
with a migration background is high compared to other European
countries. To do so, we take advantage of the 2007 Swiss Health
Survey (SHS; Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2007a) dataset that
provides detailed information on the reason for immigration while
differentiating between the first, second, and third (i.e., Swiss
natives) generations. Immigration status is defined along three major
categories of nativity: first-generation immigrants (all foreign-born;
hereafter FG), second-generation native-born (son or daughter of at
least one foreign-born parent; hereafter SG), and Swiss majority
group (sons and daughters of native-born parents; hereafter major-
ity group).
We estimate income gains (or losses) among FG and SG immi-
grant groups (as indicators of economic integration) by reason for
immigration and by gender as compared to the majority group. We
also estimate the income gain or loss of noneconomic immigrants as
compared to economic immigrants. The analysis enables us to provide
a twofold contribution to the immigration literature. First, we expand
the knowledge on patterns of immigrants' economic integration in the
context of the Swiss labour market by gender and across generations.
Second, we provide deeper insights and a better understanding of the
role played by “reason for immigration” in shaping economic integra-
tion of immigrants.
2 | THE SWISS SETTING AND THE
MIGRATION POLICY EFFECT
Switzerland is particularly interesting for studying the relations
between motives for migration and economic integration because it
has one of the largest shares of people with a migration background
in Europe, with 20.7% of its permanent population foreign born
(1,541,912), excluding short-term residents (65,159) and asylum
seekers (48,193) (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2007b). However,
despite the large proportion of the immigrant population in Switzer-
land, the state exercises a highly restrictive immigration policy in gen-
eral and citizenship laws in particular, and makes it very difficult for
immigrants to change their status (Riaño, 2003).
Swiss immigration policy represents a somewhat peculiar case as
compared to other EU countries. First, Swiss policy is very selective
and makes it difficult for non-EU/EFTA citizens to enter the country.
Preference is usually given to Swiss and EU/EFTA labourers, and strict
quotas regulate work permits. In practice, this means that nationals
from non-EU/EFTA countries can only enter if they are highly skilled
workers, executives, or specialists. Residency permits are awarded to
non-EU/EFTA immigrants only if the person is a specialist, a manager,
or a highly qualified professional, and only if no qualified Swiss or
EU/EFTA nationals can be recruited (Schindall, 2009). By way of
contrast, EU/EFTA immigrants can legally reside in Switzerland while
searching for any type of employment (Schindall, 2009). Second,
Switzerland has one of the most restrictive family reunion and refugee
policies in Western Europe. Moreover, it is one of very few countries
without a comprehensive anti-discrimination law. According to the
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX; see Niessen, Huddleston,
Citron, Geddes, & Jacobs, 2007) that compares 31 countries in Europe
and North America in terms of six different strands of integration
policies, in most aspects Switzerland is characterised as the country
with the least favourable policy toward foreigners. According to the
amendment to the asylum law of 2006, many asylum applicants com-
ing from neighbouring transit countries have been systematically
rejected and denied all social assistance (Schindall, 2009). Thus, immi-
grants usually do not have the same constitutional rights as Swiss citi-
zens. Their exact status depends on the category of work permit they
obtain (Blos et al., 1997).
Swiss migration policies may play a crucial role in creating differ-
ent sets of opportunities for different categories of migrants. How-
ever, once a work permit has been issued, Swiss labour market policy
is very passive (Blos et al., 1997). Foreigners are seen as temporary
guests; therefore, there are no special policy measures that would
facilitate integration of foreigners into the Swiss society (Blos
et al., 1997). Initial migration policy and border management, how-
ever, may still exert a significant impact on the labour market perfor-
mance of the immigrants with different groups facing differential
levels of difficulties in the labour market (Piguet, 2006). In 2007, For
example, the documented unemployment rate of Swiss citizens was
2.7%, while it reached 4% for immigrants from EU/EFTA countries
and 14% for immigrants coming from non-EU/EFTA countries
(Schindall, 2009). Moreover, non-EU/EFTA immigrants tend to be
employed in lower-skilled jobs and live in poverty at higher rates than
EU/EFTA immigrants and Swiss natives (Schindall, 2009).
To date only few empirical studies have examined the differential
impact of the immigration policy on the immigrants' labour market
performance. For instance, Blos et al. (1997) have provided a compre-
hensive comparison of the migration policy effect in Sweden and
Switzerland. They estimated the degree to which migration policy
influences immigrants' performance in the labour market and whether
a migration policy which incorporates economic considerations is sig-
nificant to migrants' economic success (Blos et al., 1997). Their main
conclusion is that migration policy does matter, though less than
expected (Blos et al., 1997). The authors report that after taking into
account socioeconomic attributes of the immigrants, cultural proxim-
ity as well as educational skills have been key determinants of
migrants' labour market success in Switzerland. Interestingly, the
study shows that long-term immigrants from outside of the EU/EFTA
have had, on average, higher skill levels than both natives and other
immigrant groups. However, this group performed worse than most
of the other migrant groups. The authors explain the lower level of
performance of immigrants from outside EU/EFTA by a lack command
of the language coupled with limited understanding of domestic
social and cultural codes combined with structural constraints
(e.g., employers' and native workers' attitudes, the existence of dual
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labour markets) that discriminate against culturally different immi-
grants (Blos et al., 1997).
Another useful example has been presented by Müller and
Tai (2010) who examined individual attitudes toward migration in
Switzerland. They argue that negative attitudes toward immigrants
can be explained by the existence of a dual labour market in the low-
skill segment of the labour market, where “good” jobs are allocated
because of efficiency–wage considerations. According to the authors,
most immigrants in the guest-worker Swiss system hold low-wage
jobs because of the legal constraints to hiring them in high-paying jobs
and the reluctance of employers to offer well-paying jobs to immi-
grants due to the high probability of them returning to their home
country. Likewise, Müller and Ramirez (2009) focused on segregation
at the firm level. Their results revealed that firms with a large propor-
tion of foreign unskilled workers pay low wages to all their employees
and that segregation at the firm level accounts for almost the entire
wage differential between identically skilled Swiss and foreign
workers (Müller & Ramirez, 2009).
3 | REASON FOR MIGRATION AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Scholars of immigrants' labour market integration have traditionally
subscribed to the classic assimilation theory, as initially presented by
Park and Burgess (1921) and subsequently elaborated upon by Gor-
don (1964), when studying social, cultural, and economic integration
of immigrants in the host society. In general, the classic assimilation
model suggests that upon arrival in the host country, immigrants
experience hardship in finding financially rewarding employment.
These difficulties are usually attributed to inadequate social, cultural,
and professional skills, a lack of language proficiency, and limited
access to social networks. However, with the passage of time and
over generations, immigrants and their offspring tend to improve their
skills, thereby advancing occupational status and increasing their
income. Immigrants' economic assimilation, therefore, represents a
monotonous progression with socioeconomic gaps between immi-
grants and native-born populations declining with the passage of time
in the host country (Chiswick, 1978; Raijman & Semyonov, 1995;
Schoeni, 1998; Semyonov, 1997).
A plethora of research in different countries demonstrates, how-
ever, that the success of the immigrants in the labour market of the
host society can vary with the characteristics of the country of origin
(e.g., Borjas, 1995; Chiswick, 1978, 1986; Duleep & Regets, 1997;
Zimmermann, 1994). The more similar the characteristics are between
the country of origin and the country of destination (especially in eco-
nomic structure and culture), the more rapid and successful is the eco-
nomic assimilation. Specifically, immigrants from countries that are
similar to the host country with respect to economic development,
labour market structure, the educational system, language, and culture
are more likely to assimilate faster in the labour market of the host
society. This expectation is a result of a better transferability of the
human capital resources acquired by immigrants in their country of
birth. Conversely, with lower transferability of human capital
resources between the two countries there are higher earning disad-
vantages of the immigrants at their time of arrival to the destination
country coupled together with their slower assimilation into its soci-
ety. At the same time, it could well be the case that the dual system
of migration rights in Switzerland, which creates more favourable con-
ditions for the economic integration of EU/EFTA migrants than for
non-EU/EFTA migrants (e.g., greater number of years to obtain per-
manent residence status for non-EU/EFTA migrants than for
EU/EFTA migrants), further contributes to the more successful eco-
nomic integration of economic immigrants who often come from
EU/EFTA countries (Piguet, 2006; Schindall, 2009). Indeed, many
Swiss employers favour migrants with permanent residence status
(Schindall, 2009).
To date, only a few studies compared economic assimilation of
immigrant groups classified by motive for immigration (for notable
exceptions see Barrett, 1998; Connor, 2010; Green & Green, 1995;
Duleep & Regets, 1996; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1995). The scarcity of
studies on the topic cannot be attributed to shortsightedness of
researchers but rather to the scarceness of the data (e.g.,
Bevelander & Pendakur, 2014; Connor, 2010). It should be noted,
however, that the few studies examining economic integration
across different types of immigrants persuasively contend that,
among other things, the motive for migration plays a major role in
explaining differential levels of economic success of immigrants in
the new country, with economic immigrants doing better than
others (e.g., Bauer, Lofstrom, & Zimmermann, 2000; Bevelander &
Pendakur, 2014; Hugo, 2014).
Students of immigration generally distinguish between two main
motives for migration: economic and noneconomic (e.g., Bevelander &
Pendakur, 2014; Chiswick et al., 2005; Connor, 2010; Duleep &
Regets, 1996). According to this literature, economic immigrants are
likely to seek earnings maximisation2; they decide to move if the
expected difference in income between the destination and the origin
countries is higher than the costs of migration (e.g., Borjas, 1982,
1987, 1990; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990). That is, economically driven
immigrants arrive in the new country in order to convert human capi-
tal resources into higher economic outcomes. However, as indicated
earlier, a growing body of research has criticised this binary division
(Castles, 2010; Van Hear, Brubaker, & Bessa, 2009) because immi-
grants can be motivated by mixed reasons for migration
(Lorenzen, 2017). In addition, immigrants categorised as noneconomic
are likely to try to convert human capital into economic outcomes and
obtain good jobs. The main difference between these groups is not
only due to differential processes of self-selection but also that
different groups may be potentially susceptible to different integra-
tion policies with policies favouring economic immigrants rather than
noneconomic ones (Blos et al., 1997).
The few (and mostly rather dated) empirical studies that focused
on the link between the reason for immigration and economic assimi-
lation relied on data from Canada, United States, or Australia as well
as several European countries that provide information on the admis-
sion criteria or visa category. For example, using Canadian data, Green
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and Green (1995) demonstrated that family and political immigrants
are more likely to be concentrated in less skilled occupations than
economic immigrants. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995), Duleep and
Regets (1996), and Barrett (1998) compared immigrants who entered
the United States under different admission criteria. Using the
1977–1990 Immigrant-Naturalisation Cohort (INC) data, Jasso and
Rosenzweig (1995) were able to show that at the time of arrival, earn-
ing levels of immigrants who came to work in the United States were
significantly higher than those who gained admission based on family
ties. However, the data reveal that the gap in occupational status
between the two groups had become significantly smaller with the
passage of time in the United States due to higher rates of occupa-
tional downgrading among “employment immigrants” and occupa-
tional upgrading among “kinship immigrants.”
Duleep and Regets (1996) reported similar systematic inverse
relationships between initial earnings and subsequent earning growth.
Specifically, they showed that immigrants admitted on the basis of
family ties into the United States earn substantially less at the time of
arrival than immigrants admitted on the basis of occupational skills.
Kinship immigrants, however, experience a faster wage growth than
immigrants admitted on the basis of skills. Connor (2010) compared
employment, occupation, and earning outcomes of refugees versus
other immigrants in the United States. His findings demonstrate that
although refugees find jobs after the initial resettlement, the occupa-
tional level and subsequent rate of pay for these jobs are considerably
lower than those of other immigrants.
The motive for migration as a factor influencing differential pat-
terns of immigrants' economic assimilation was discussed by several
researchers in the European context as well. For example, Winter-
Ebmer (1994) demonstrated that immigrants who migrate to Austria
for economic reasons (because they want to raise their standard of liv-
ing) attain significantly higher wages than those who migrate on the
basis of family ties or political reasons. Bevelander (2011) examined
differences in employment trajectories in the Swedish labour market
among resettled refugees, asylum claimants (asylum seekers who may
subsequently obtain a residence permit), and immigrants who arrive
for family reunification. He found that family immigrants are on a
faster path to integration in terms of employment than asylum claim-
ants, who in turn have faster employment integration than resettled
refugees (Bevelander, 2011).
Several other studies also confirm that forced migrants represent
a disadvantaged group not only in comparison to the native-born pop-
ulation but also in comparison to other economic and noneconomic
immigrants. This consistent finding led researchers to coin the term
“refugee gap” (e.g., Aydemir, 2011; Connor, 2010; Wilkinson, 2008).
However, a recent study from the Netherlands (Bakker, Dagevos, &
Engbersen, 2017) has revealed that, in the Netherlands, the refugee
gap exists only at the beginning of refugees' working careers but
diminishes with the passage of time.
The literature on the gender gap shows that modes of immigrants'
economic integration into the labour market of the host society quite
differs by gender and that immigrant women experience greater
difficulties than immigrant men to integrate into the labour market of
the host society (see, e.g., Riaño & Baghdadi, 2007 for Switzerland;
Fleischmann & Höhne, 2013 for Germany; Raijman &
Semyonov, 1997, 1998 for Israel; Logan & Rivera Drew, 2011 for the
United States). Unfortunately, literature that explores the gender gap
in economic integration while accounting for different reasons for
immigration is currently very limited. This lacuna is unfortunate,
because by investigating the gender gap by reason for immigration we
could better understand the specific challenges that each group faces
upon immigration. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we distin-
guish between men and women to explore whether and to what
extent immigrants' labour market assimilation, as shaped by motives
of immigration, differs across gender groups while accounting for the
potential impact of policies in the country of destination.
4 | RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND
EXPECTATIONS
We are interested in determining the answer to the following ques-
tion: Do immigrants in Switzerland who define themselves as eco-
nomic immigrants fare better than other immigrant groups in terms of
income attainment? Subsequently, in the analysis that follows, we
examine whether and to what extent the size of the income disparity
(as an indicator of economic integration) between the majority group
and immigrants is influenced by the motive/reason for migration. We
distinguish between economic and noneconomic immigrant subgroups
according to the reason/motive for migration: (1) political persecution
and/or war (hereafter—political immigrants); (2) economic reasons
(hereafter—economic immigrants); (3) living with a partner and/or
reunifying with the family (hereafter—family reunion immigrants);
and (4) pursuing an educational/training programme (hereafter—
educational immigrants).
Reviewing the studies discussed at the outset of this article leads
us to the following expectations: First, according to the classic assimi-
lation model, we expect that economic disadvantages of immigrants
(compared to natives) are likely to be less pronounced in the SG than
in the FG. SG immigrants are more acquainted with the country, its
system, labour market, language, and culture than their parents were,
and thus they are likely to perform more similarly to the majority
group in the labour market compared to the performance of their par-
ents. Furthermore, for the reasons discussed above, we expect that
the economic disadvantages, when compared to the majority group,
are less pronounced among economic immigrants than among non-
economic immigrant groups. Third, we expect that when compared to
the majority group of the same gender, income disadvantages of
female immigrants will be higher than that of male immigrants for
both FG and SG because of the difficulty that females face in the
labour market, which may be particularly evident for female immi-
grants. In the analysis that follows, we put to test our theoretical
expectations by estimating the economic costs (income loss or gain
due to immigration when compared to natives) among FG and SG
immigrants for the four immigrant categories. We estimate the costs
separately for the different genders and reasons for immigration
MASKILEYSON ET AL. 5 of 17
groups as compared to the majority group. Notably, we define eco-
nomic costs associated with immigration as an income gap between
immigrants and the native population, which remains after controlling
for relevant background factors. When the difference is in favour of
immigrants, we view it as income gain, and when it is the opposite, we
refer to it as a loss. The income loss is often referred to in the
literature as penalty (Berthoud, 2000; Hasmath, 2012; Heath &
Cheung, 2007; Maskileyson & Semyonov, 2017; Semyonov
et al., 2015). When comparing a subgroup of immigrants to either the
majority group or to the “economic immigrants,” we refer to the gain
(or loss) as an indicator of economic integration that can be attributed
to the immigration status and the reason for immigration.
5 | DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHOD
5.1 | Data and variables
Data for the analysis were obtained from the 2007 Swiss Health
Survey (SHS) conducted jointly by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(SFSO) and the Institute MIS-Trend SA (Lausanne and Gümligen)
(Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2007a).3 The SHS database repre-
sents a cross-sectional, nationally representative sample that provides
information on the health status, health-relevant attitudes, behaviour,
and living conditions of the population, the total personal earned
income as well as detailed information on migration, labour force
activity, and sociodemographic attributes (Calmonte, Galati-Petrecca,
Lieberherr, Neuhaus, & Kahlmeier, 2005). The total sample size we
analysed included 9,576 respondents between the ages of 21 and
65 years who were employed in the labour market. Share of excluded
people at ages 21 to 65 years who were out of the labour force con-
sisted of 21.00% (2,869). Among the FG and SG economic male immi-
grants, 12.00% were not in the labour force, and among the family,
political, and educational FG and SG male immigrants these figures
were 14.17%, 19.31%, and 14.29%, respectively. The share of female
FG and SG immigrants who were out of the labour market was con-
siderably higher. Specifically, among female economic immigrants, the
percentage of not participating in the labour force was 22.79%, and
among the family, political, and educational female immigrants this
percentage was 30.16%, 29.13%, and 24.71%, respectively.4
In an attempt to analyse the data by origin, we differentiated
between EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA origin of the immigrants.
Non-European immigrants included mostly those coming from the
Middle East, Africa, South America, and the Far East (i.e., mainly eco-
nomically less developed countries compared to EU/EFTA countries).
The total number of non-EU/EFTA immigrants in the sample com-
prised 524 FG and only 27 SG immigrants. The majority of male and
female migrants come to Switzerland from the EU/EFTA areas. Non-
EU/EFTA immigrants represent a smaller share of the immigrants
entering Switzerland (30.57% and 27.86% of FG men and women,
respectively). The highest share of non-EU/EFTA was found among
FG political immigrants (83.67% and 59.68% of FG men and women,
respectively).
Data were collected via telephone and written questionnaires.
The survey was conducted in two stages: During the first stage, a
random sample of persons residing in Switzerland with a landline tele-
phone number was interviewed on the phone using computer assisted
telephone interviews (CATI). During the second stage, the persons
who were interviewed by telephone were sent a paper and pencil
questionnaire.
The question measuring reason for immigration queried for the
subjectively assessed main reason a respondent or his/her parents
came to Switzerland. The response was defined by four major catego-
ries5: (1) because of political persecution and/or war; (2) for economic
reasons; (3) to live with the partner and/or family; and (4) to pursue
an educational/training programme. Generational status of the immi-
grant was defined along three major categories of nativity: FG, SG,
and majority group.
In addition, we selected a series of variables pertaining to
sociodemographic characteristics of respondents and human capital
resources as predictors of personal earned income from work. These
variables are traditionally used in models estimating the economic
assimilation of immigrants (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2015). The
sociodemographic attributes included age and age squared (in years);
years since migration (in years); household size; citizenship status (citi-
zen = 1, noncitizen was the reference category); health status (ranging
between 1 = poor subjective health and 5 = excellent subjective
health); rural residence status (with rural area = 1, and not in a rural
area as the reference category); marital status (with married = 1, and 0
otherwise). The human capital resources included education, occupa-
tional status, and number of hours of work per week. Education was
represented by two dummy variables: (a) lower education (not
completed secondary education or lower) and (b) academic education
(tertiary education). Intermediate education (completed secondary or
postsecondary nonacademic education) served as the reference cate-
gory. Occupational status was defined by three dummy variables indi-
cating whether one was employed as (a) a worker, (b) a small-time
entrepreneur, or (c) a clerk, with (d) professional and managerial occu-
pations serving as the reference category. Annual hours of work were
presented in number of hours. Differences among immigrant's coun-
tries of origin were introduced by including gross domestic product
(GDP) of country of origin (transformed as natural logarithm).
Immigrant's personal monthly income, which serves as the depen-
dent variable and as an indicator for economic integration, was
defined as the total earned income (in Swiss Francs [CHF]) from work
during the last month prior to the survey. For a detailed definition of
all the variables included in the analysis, see Appendix B.
5.2 | Method of Estimating the Income Gain/Loss
of Immigration as an Indicator of Economic Integration
In order to estimate the income gain/loss, we decomposed the mean
difference between the groups via the use of regression equations for
males and females separately (see Semyonov et al., 2015). The analy-
sis includes two main parts: (1) In the first part we compared each
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subgroup of immigrants to the majority population group (i.e., Swiss
natives whose parents were also born in Switzerland); (2) to take all
immigration-related attributes into account, we focused only on
immigrants and compared noneconomic immigrants to economic
immigrants (i.e., the advantaged immigrant group). The analysis is
presented for men and women separately.
The decomposition was performed by first estimating the
expected mean income of immigrant groups of the FG and SG, had
the income of these groups been determined exactly like that of the
reference group (i.e., majority group or economic immigrants of the




Btg × Xmg ð1Þ
where Ŷmg represents the expected mean income of the (FG or SG)
immigrant group (mg); the term Xmg represents a vector of the
mean characteristics of a specific immigrant group. Ag and Btg
represent the intercept and the regression coefficient vector
obtained from a regression equation predicting income of the majority
group or economic immigrants of the same gender group (i.e., the
reference group).
After estimating the expected income of the subgroup, the “cost”
is obtained by subtracting the expected mean income (Ŷmg ) from the
actual mean income of the male or female immigrant subgroup (Ymg).
The regression equation includes age, age squared, education, occupa-
tional status, marital status, hours of work, household size, health sta-
tus, and rural/urban region of living. The difference between the
observed (actual) income of each immigrant group serves as the esti-
mate of the gain or loss (C) and is expressed by the following
formulation:





C, then, serves as a proxy of the gain or loss that a group of immi-
grants (either FG or SG) experienced due to immigration.
6 | ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
6.1 | Descriptive overview
In Tables 1a and 1b we display a descriptive overview with the
mean values (or percentage) of the socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics of the employed males and females in the sample.
The information is presented by reason for immigration and by
generation (i.e., FG, SG, and majority group). We only present cells
with more than 30 units. The data displayed in Tables 1a (for
males) and 1b (for females) reveal meaningful differences across the
subgroups.
Table 1a shows that among FG males, the average observed
monthly income of political, economic, and family reunion immigrants
is lower than that of the majority group. However, FG immigrant men
who arrived for educational reasons display higher income than that of
Swiss native males. Curiously, the picture changes among SG. Not
only are the incomes of children of economic and family reunion
immigrants still lower than that of Swiss native men, but also the
income of children of educational immigrants (unlike their parents) is
lower than that of the majority group. In fact, SG males of economic
and noneconomic immigrant groups report, on average, lower income
than that reported by Swiss native men.
Among immigrant women, the picture looks somewhat different,
as Table 1b demonstrates. In all cases, with the exception of FG family
reunion female immigrants, the income of FG and SG is higher than
that of Swiss female natives. Indeed, in the SG, the income of all immi-
grants surpasses that of Swiss native women.
When summing up the descriptive findings regarding income
differentials between groups of immigrants classified by reason for
immigration, it appears that among FG men, educational immigrants
are characterised by the highest level of income and FG political
immigrants are characterised by the lowest level of income. Among
SG men, economic and educational immigrants earn most. Among
female FG and SG immigrants, the income of educational immigrants
is the highest.
Yet the immigrant groups differ considerably not only by their
income level but also by sociodemographic attributes. For example,
FG and SG male educational immigrants have the highest level of
education and share in professional and managerial occupations,
while political immigrant men (FG) the lowest. FG educational male
immigrants are the healthiest, while political immigrants the least
healthy. FG male political immigrants originate from relatively disad-
vantaged countries in terms of GDP, followed by the economic
immigrants who also emigrate from countries with a lower average
GDP. Finally, it is also interesting to note that Swiss citizenship is
not always associated with the length of stay in Switzerland. For
example, despite the lowest rate of citizenship (31%), the group of
FG economic immigrant men has, on average, lived in Switzerland
longer than any other immigrant group (23 years). The group of FG
political immigrant men has the highest percentage of Swiss citi-
zens (51%).
The educational level of FG educational female immigrants is the
highest. Political FG female immigrants are characterised by the low-
est level of reported subjective health, and educational female immi-
grants have the highest share in professional and managerial
occupations.
Political and family female FG immigrants are from the poorer
countries as compared to economic and educational immigrants.
Finally, the group of FG political immigrant women has the highest
percentage of Swiss citizens (76%) who have also lived in
Switzerland the longest (29 years). The lowest citizenship rate is
found for FG economic immigrant women (44%) who have
remained in the country longer (25 years) than educational or
family reunion immigrants.
Although the mean income differences associated with immigrant
status and reason for immigration discussed above are meaningful, it
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 of 17 MASKILEYSON ET AL.
is not clear whether and to what extent income gain/loss between
subgroups of immigrants and the majority group can be attributed to
immigration status or to variations in sociodemographic characteris-
tics. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we decompose the mean
income gaps between each subgroup of immigrants and the majority
group to estimate the portion of the income gap that is attributed to
immigrant status after controlling for differences in socioeconomic
and human capital attributes.
6.2 | Income gain/loss comparing FG and SG
immigrants to the majority group
Next, we examine the income gain/loss of immigrants by reason for
immigration, generation, and gender. Tables 2a and 2b present the
calculations for men and women, respectively. We present, for each
group, the actual mean earned income in the first row, and their
predicted mean income had they been born a Swiss native in the sec-
ond row. In the third row, we present the calculated difference
between the two, that is, the estimated gain/loss that can be attrib-
uted to immigration. In each table, we present a combined group of
noneconomic immigrants (i.e., political, family, and educational),
the noneconomic immigrant subgroups in detail, and economic
immigrants.
The results of the analysis in Table 2a that pertains to male immi-
grants reveal that the combined group of noneconomic male immi-
grants experiences income loss in both generations (510 CHF and
155 CHF for FG and SG, respectively). Looking at the detailed resolu-
tion of the noneconomic subgroups, political immigrants experience
the largest income penalty as compared to the majority group (1,293
CHF for FG). We should also note that results for SG noneconomic
immigrants, where N < 30, are not presented. Family immigrants also
experience financial loss in both generations (397 CHF and 267 CHF
for FG and SG, respectively). Interestingly, and contrary to our expec-
tations, the subgroup of educational immigrants is the only noneco-
nomic group to actually gain income due to immigration as compared
to the majority group. The income gain of educational immigrant men
(compared to the majority group) increased from 60 CHF in the FG to
212 CHF in the SG.
In line with our expectations, economic immigrants actually gain
income due to immigration as compared to the majority group. In
other words, had the income of economic immigrant men been
determined exactly as the income of the comparable Swiss male
majority group, their income would have been actually lower than
their actual income. More specifically, as compared to Swiss native
men, the gain among economic FG immigrant men consisted of
65 CHF, and the gain of the SG economic immigrant men amounted
to 289 CHF.
The findings for female immigrants were somewhat different
from those obtained for men. All groups of FG immigrant women
experienced a penalty as compared to native Swiss women. The data
in Table 2b show that the earning penalties among FG females were
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immigrant categories (181 CHF and 288 CHF for these groups,
respectively). However, the estimated values for the SG suggested
that full economic convergence with the majority group occurred in
all cases. Noneconomic and economic SG female immigrants not only
succeeded to close the gap with the majority group but to surpass it
(with a gain of 122 CHF and 265 CHF, respectively).
TABLE 2a Actual mean monthly income (row 1), predicted
income (row 2), and gain/loss of income (in CHF) of first- and
second-generation immigrants compared to the majority group
obtained through an indirect standardisation procedure when
immigrant subgroups are compared to the majority group (row 3)
FG SG
All noneconomic
Observed income 5,974 5,932
Predicted income compared to majority
group
6,483 6,086
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
−510 −155
N of cases 356 110
Political
Observed income 4,700 –
Predicted income compared to majority
group
5,993 –
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
−1,293 –
N of cases 98 –
Family
Observed income 6,071 5,641
Predicted income compared to majority
group
6,468 5,908
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
−397 −267
N of cases 156 54
Educational
Observed income 7,038 6,314
Predicted income compared to majority
group
6,978 6,103
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
60 212
N of cases 102 39
Economic
Observed income 6,166 6,284
Predicted income compared to majority
group
6,101 5,995
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
65 289
N of cases 537 217
Note: Men, employed, aged 21–65 years The models control for age, age
squared, education (whether low, middle, or high), occupation (whether a
worker, small entrepreneur, a clerk, or professional and manager), hours of
work, marital status (whether married or not), household size, health
status, and whether one lives in a rural area, years since migration (for FG
only). Political SG is not presented because N < 30.
Abbreviations: FG = first-generation immigrants; SG = second-generation
immigrants.
TABLE 2b Actual mean monthly income (row 1), predicted
income (row 2), and gain/loss of income (in CHF) of immigrants
compared to the majority group obtained through an indirect
standardisation procedure when immigrant subgroups are compared
to the majority group (row 3)
FG SG
All noneconomic
Observed income 3,551 3,994
Predicted income compared to majority
group
3,738 3,872
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
−187 122
N of cases 475 137
Political
Observed income 3,682 –
Predicted income compared to majority
group
3,756 –
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
−74 –
N of cases 62 –
Family
Observed income 3,268 3,789
Predicted income compared to majority
group
3,448 3,774
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
−181 15
N of cases 309 88
Educational
Observed income 4,304 –
Predicted income compared to majority
group
4,592 –
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
−288 –
N of cases 104 –
Economic
Observed income 3,687 4,000
Predicted income compared to majority
group
3,690 3,735
Income gain/loss compared to majority
group
−3 265
N of cases 426 243
Note: Women, employed, aged 21–65 years. The models control for age,
age squared, education (whether low, middle, or high), occupation
(whether a worker, small entrepreneur, a clerk, or professional and
manager), hours of work, marital status (whether married or not),
household size, health status, and whether one lives in a rural area, years
since migration (for FG only). Political and educational SG are not
presented because N < 30.
Abbreviations: FG = first-generation immigrants; SG = second-generation
immigrants.
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6.3 | Income gain/loss comparing noneconomic FG
and SG immigrants to economic FG and SG immigrants
Findings of the decomposition analysis comparing noneconomic immi-
grants and economic immigrants (i.e., the most advantaged immigrant
subgroup) are presented in Tables 3a and 3b. Using economic immi-
grants as a group of comparison allows us to control additionally for
attributes such as years since migration and GDP of country of origin,
variables that were not accounted for when compared to the majority
group. Therefore, in Tables 3a and 3b, we report the results of
analyses examining whether intergroup differences in income
gain/loss between economic and noneconomic immigrants are net of
differences in the characteristics of the immigrants. We compared,
combined, and detailed noneconomic immigrant subgroups to eco-
nomic immigrants, and these calculations are presented in Tables 3a
and 3b for men and women, respectively.
Consistent with the previous analysis, noneconomic male immi-
grants experience economic loss in both generations. In other words,
had the income of noneconomic immigrants been determined exactly
the same way as the income of economic immigrant men, their
TABLE 3a Actual mean monthly income (row 1), predicted
income (row 2), and gain or loss of income obtained through an
indirect standardisation procedure when noneconomic immigrants are
compared to economic immigrants, FG and SG, respectively (row 3)
FG SG
All noneconomic
Observed income 5,974 5,932
Predicted income compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
6,334 7,024
Income gain/loss compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
−361 −1,092
N of cases 356 110
Political
Observed income 4,700 –
Predicted income compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
5,432 –
Income gain/loss compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
−732 –
N of cases 98 –
Family
Observed income 6,071 5,641
Predicted income compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
6,426 6,844
Income gain/loss compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
−355 −1,203
N of cases 156 54
Educational
Observed income 7,038 6,314
Predicted income compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
7,062 6,934
Income gain/loss compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
−25 −620
N of cases 102 39
Note: Men, employed, aged 21–65 years, in CHF. The models control for
age, age squared, years since migration, education (whether low, middle,
or high), occupation (whether a worker, small entrepreneur, a clerk, or
professional and manager), hours of work, marital status (whether married
or not), household size, Swiss citizenship, health status, whether one lives
in a rural area, and GDP of country of origin (ln), years since migration
(for FG only). Political SG is not presented because N < 30.
Abbreviations: FG = first-generation immigrants; SG = second-generation
immigrants.
TABLE 3b Actual mean monthly income (row 1), predicted
income (row 2), and gain or loss of income obtained through an
indirect standardisation procedure when noneconomic immigrants are
compared to economic immigrants, FG and SG, respectively (row 3)
FG SG
All noneconomic
Observed income 3,551 3,994
Predicted income compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
3,817 4,041
Income gain/loss compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
−266 −47
N of cases 475 137
Political
Observed income 3,682 –
Predicted income compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
3,809 –
Income gain/loss compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
−127 –
N of cases 62 –
Family
Observed income 3,268 3,789
Predicted income compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
3,526 4,009
Income gain/loss compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
−258 −220
N of cases 309 88
Educational
Observed income 4,304 –
Predicted income compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
4,694 –
Income gain/loss compared to economic
FG or SG immigrants
−390 –
N of cases 104 –
Note: Women, employed, aged 21–65 years, in CHF. The models control
for age, age squared, years since migration, education (whether low,
middle, or high), occupation (whether a worker, small entrepreneur, a
clerk, or professional and manager), hours of work, marital status (whether
married or not), household size, Swiss citizenship, health status, whether
one lives in a rural area, and GDP of country of origin (ln), years since
migration (for FG only). Political and educational SG are not presented
because N < 30.
Abbreviations: FG = first-generation immigrants; SG = second-generation
immigrants.
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income would in fact have been higher than their actual attained
income. More specifically, the results for men displayed in Table 3a
show that the loss of noneconomic FG immigrants consisted of
361 CHF as compared to FG economic immigrants, and the loss of
the SG noneconomic immigrants amounted to 1,092 CHF as com-
pared to SG economic immigrants. In other words, the income penalty
of noneconomic immigrant men increased threefold among SG
immigrants.
More specifically for men, the financial loss of political FG immi-
grants was 732 CHF as compared to economic FG immigrants. The
income penalty experienced by family reunion immigrants (compared
to economic immigrants) increased from 355 CHF in the FG to 1,203
CHF in the SG. Similarly, the income penalty of educational immi-
grants increased from 25 CHF to 620 CHF (as compared to the
respective economic immigrant group).
The findings for female immigrants were somewhat different than
those obtained for men. Noneconomic immigrants also experienced
economic loss in both generations in comparison to FG and SG eco-
nomic immigrants, respectively. The income loss, however, among SG
noneconomic immigrants was considerably smaller than the loss
among the respective FG group (47 CHF vs. 266 CHF). All groups of
FG noneconomic immigrants experienced a penalty as compared to
economic FG immigrants. The data presented in Table 3b reveal that
the earning penalties among FG females were especially substantial
for women in the family reunion and educational immigrant categories
(258 CHF and 390 CHF for these groups, respectively). Results for SG
noneconomic immigrants, where N < 30, are not presented.
In an attempt to analyse whether disparate immigration policies
toward immigrants of EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA origin were conse-
quential for their economic integration, we decomposed the income
gaps for the two groups of FG immigrants (see Appendix A). Due to
the low number of cases of noneconomic immigrants, we pooled all
FG noneconomic immigrants from non-EU/EFTA countries together,
for men and women separately. We used economic immigrants of
EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA origin as a group of comparison for non-
economic EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA immigrants, respectively. For
both EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA groups, the results suggested that
noneconomic immigrants are disadvantaged as compared to economic
immigrants, also after holding their origin constant.
7 | SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The major goal of the present study was to examine whether the rea-
son for immigration makes a difference: Do economic FG and SG
immigrants fare better than FG and SG noneconomic immigrants?
We examined economic immigrants and three subgroups (subjec-
tively assessed as political, family reunification, or educational) of
noneconomic immigrants. We analysed data pertaining to the Swiss
context. The analysis focused on comparing FG and SG male and
female immigrants. Two comparisons were conducted: The first
focused on comparing four groups of FG and SG immigrants (classi-
fied by reason for immigration, economic and noneconomic) with the
majority group and the second focused on comparing the three non-
economic FG and SG immigrant groups with the group of economic
FG and SG immigrants.
The results reveal that the motive for immigration plays a major
role in the process of labour market assimilation and that economic
integration patterns were not uniform across male and female immi-
grants. First and foremost, immigrating due to economic reasons is
likely to result in a more successful economic integration than noneco-
nomic immigration. This was true for both male and female economic
immigrants. More specifically, we found that male economic immi-
grants had an advantage in the Swiss labour market as compared to
native Swiss citizens already in the FG and that female economic
immigrants caught up with their male counterparts in the SG. Thus,
immigrants with an economic motivation to migrate were generally
able to realise their goals, and for women this economic assimilation
process lasted until the SG.
Second, integration patterns differed substantially across male
noneconomic immigration groups and across generations. Interest-
ingly, educational male immigrants did almost as well as economic
immigrants. This finding was puzzling given that educational immi-
grants may typically come to Switzerland for a defined period for the
purpose of studying. The data suggest that they are well integrated in
the labour market and that the children of those educational immi-
grants who settled in the country continued to do very well and even
better than the comparable majority group. At the same time, FG male
political and family immigrants experienced substantial economic
losses. The income they earned was considerably lower than that of
an average Swiss native with similar sociodemographic and human
capital attributes. In addition, the income of male family immigrants
did not converge to the majority group's income level, even in the SG.
The findings that pertain to economic integration of noneconomic
immigrant females reveal penalties for all types of female immigrants
in the FG as compared to their native Swiss counterparts. The difficul-
ties in attaining successful economic outcomes are particularly evident
for those women arriving in Switzerland for family reunion and educa-
tional reasons. In the SG, however, female immigrants have succeeded
in converging to the income levels of the comparable local population.
In other words, in the SG, the impact of immigration on economic
attainment among women vanishes not only for economic but also for
noneconomic female immigrants.
We suspect that these results might be related to the extremely
restrictive Swiss immigration policies, especially with regard to family
reunion and asylum seeking immigrants. These policies present signifi-
cant difficulties particularly for FG immigrants. While Swiss policies
toward family reunion and asylum seeking are demanding in terms of
the conditions allowing these groups into the country, at the same
time they do not encourage the economic integration of these group
members. By way of contrast, EU/EFTA immigrants, who come to
Switzerland primarily for economic reasons, have a priority on the job
market with fewer limitations. These advantageous conditions allow
economic immigrants to pursue their economic goals in the labour
market more freely. It seems that immigration policies effectively hin-
dered the social integration of FG female immigrants. Consequently,
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female FG immigrants seem to be employed at levels well below their
qualifications and attain lower returns on human capital resources as
compared to Swiss women.
Interestingly, when comparing noneconomic immigrants to either
FG or SG economic immigrants, among men, not only do noneco-
nomic immigrants experience penalty, but the penalty is considerably
higher in the SG than in the FG group. By way of contrast, among
women, SG noneconomic immigrants are less disadvantaged than FG
noneconomic immigrants (in comparison to female economic immi-
grants). Thus, while the economic integration gap between economic
and noneconomic immigrants among males increases across genera-
tions, female noneconomic immigrants manage to decrease the gap
with their economic counterparts.
Furthermore, holding the origin (EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA)
constant did not alter the main conclusion: Noneconomic immigrants
(both EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA) are economically disadvantaged in
the Swiss labour market as compared to their respective economic
immigrant groups. Based on these findings, we suggest that while
migration policies might have an influence on the selection process,
and while EU/EFTA immigrants may have more favourable conditions
for integrating in the Swiss labour market, it seems that the reason for
migration plays a major role in immigrants' economic integration. That
is, economic immigrants fare better than the others in the Swiss
labour market in terms of income attainment.
Notwithstanding the significance of the data, which contained
valuable and rare information about the reason for immigration, our
study is not free of limitations. First, our study focuses on those immi-
grants who are employed in the Swiss labour market. As a result, we
excluded from the dataset respondents who indicated that they are
out of the labour force. Thus, our study set the goal to investigate the
economic integration of those in the labour force and not all immi-
grants altogether. Second, while the Swiss context is important and
unique in Europe because of its high share of immigrants, patterns of
immigrant integration in Switzerland may not be generalised to other
immigration societies in Europe and elsewhere. Whether and to what
extent economic immigrants are successful also in other European
countries remains to be studied. Third, whereas we relied on data in
which the respondents assessed their main reason of immigration
themselves, it is very likely that immigrants actually arrived due to a
mixture of reasons. Education and family immigrants were also likely
to try to obtain better economic conditions, political immigrants were
also looking for well-paid jobs, and economic immigrants might have
also had other reasons to immigrate. The differentiation we used is
nevertheless important because it reflects the subjective evaluation of
the main reason of immigration, and it mirrors the dual Swiss policy
toward economic and noneconomic immigrants. Indeed, whereas it is
more favourable toward economic immigrants, it sets harder condi-
tions for economic integration on other types of immigrants.
In summary, in this study we provide a twofold contribution to
the immigration literature. First, we expanded the knowledge on pat-
terns of immigrants' economic integration in the context of the Swiss
labour market not only in the FG but also in the SG for both male and
female immigrants. Second, we provide deeper insights into these
phenomena, expanding the understanding of the role played by (sub-
jectively assessed) motive behind migration behaviour in the eco-
nomic integration of immigrants. More specifically, we find that the
reason for immigration plays a crucial role in the process of labour
market integration. Immigrants arriving in Switzerland due to eco-
nomic reasons and employed in the labour market exhibit rapid eco-
nomic integration thereby literally succeeding to fulfil their goal of
economic prosperity. Despite some variations between immigrant
men and women, we find that economic immigrants are likely to out-
perform the comparable native Swiss in attainment of economic out-
comes not only in the first but also in the SG, whereas for many
noneconomic immigrants, the path toward economic integration is
arduous.
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1 While it could well be the case that the Swiss government categorises
immigrants in a somewhat different way compared to the way immi-
grants categorise themselves, and while it is likely that immigrants arrive
due to a mixture of reasons, it is safe to assume that in most cases the
subjective self-categorization of immigrants as for their main reason of
immigration is similar to the one attributed to them by the Swiss
government.
2 The focus of the present study is on material returns in the form of
income. It should be noted, however, that in addition to income
maximisation, immigrants might also seek other noneconomic returns.
3 The German name for the dataset is “Bundesamt für Statistik,
Schweizerische Gesundheitsbefragung 2007.”
4 Our study and conclusions focus thus on the economic integration of
those immigrants who are successfully employed in the Swiss labour
market.
5 The fifth category “other” was omitted from the analysis.
6 In practice, the mean values of the characteristics listed in the variables
section of the immigrant population are inserted into the regression
equation that predicts income of the reference population (i.e., majority
group or economic immigrants).
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APPENDIX A.
Actual mean monthly income (row 1), predicted income (row 2), and gain or loss of income obtained through an indirect standardisation
procedure when EU/EFTA or Non-EU/EFTA noneconomic FG immigrants are compared to economic FG immigrants, EU/EFTA or
Non-EU/EFTA, respectively (row 3). Employed, aged 21–65 years, in CHF
Men Women
EU/EFTA Non-EU/EFTA EU/EFTA Non EU/EFTA
Observed income 6,539 5,336 3,819 3,061
Predicted income compared to FG economic EU/EFTA or non-EU/EFTA 6,970 5,389 3,861 3,630
Income gain/loss compared to FG economic EU/EFTA or non-EU/EFTA −431 −54 −42 −569
N of cases 188 168 305 170
Note: The models control for age, age squared, years since migration, education (whether low, middle, or high), occupation (whether a worker, small
entrepreneur, a clerk, or professional and manager), hours of work, marital status (whether married or not), household size, Swiss citizenship, health status,
whether one lives in a rural area, and GDP of country of origin (ln), years since migration.




Personal monthly income In CHF, personal net monthly income, again after deduction of compulsory social insurance contributions
and pension fund contributions, plus or minus any alimony (maintenance) payments
Reason of immigration Political reasons, economic reasons, family reasons, educational reasons
Generational status First generation, second generation, majority group
Age of respondent In years
Household size Number of persons
Citizenship status Citizen, not citizen
Health status 1–5, where 1 = poor subjective health and 5 = excellent subjective health
Rural residence In a rural area or not in a rural area
Marital status Married or otherwise
Gender Male or female
Education Lower education; academic education; intermediate education
Hours of work Number of hours
Occupational status Worker, small entrepreneur, clerk, professional and managerial occupations
Years since migration In years, SG in Tables 3a and 3b was assigned the value 0
Gross domestic product of country of
origin (GDP) (in ln)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), transformed as a natural logarithm. GDP is assigned based on
the main nationality indicated by the person. Source: World Bank, 2007
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